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Through analysis of empirical interview data this research undertakes to investigate
the ways in which the growing phenomenon of cyberpower – defined as using
cyberspace for advantage and influence – is impacting on institutional development
in Norway. Exploring this governance challenge through the conceptual framework
of complexity, difference and emergence opens space – political or otherwise – for
discussion regarding why rapid developments arising from digitalization are transforming
the way individuals, organizations, institutions and states behave, relate and make
decisions. Cyberpower is creating an uncertain institutional landscape as a dependency
vs. vulnerability paradox shapes values, rules and norms. Findings from this thematic
analysis of qualitative data reflect this paradox, and suggest that organizations in
Norway are in a survival-mode that is blocking collaboration. This occurs as national
governance systems, human capacity and cyberpower effects lack synergy making
for an uneasy arena where complexity, contestation and emerging challenges frame
institutional development. To improve long-term prospects of governing cyberpower
effects requires a cross-sectorial conflation of time and human resources. This means
consciously taking steps to merge organizational and institutional boundaries through
expressive innovative collaborations that foster a shared and holistic agenda. The
emerging challenges cyberpower is presenting across multiple domains means further
research is recommended to build a richer understanding of the term cyberpower from
different perspectives. The investigation recommends investment in building the skills
and capacities necessary for the co-creation of new models and strategies for managing
the effects of cyberpower.
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INTRODUCTION
Improving cyber security prospects, nationally and internationally, involves key institutions
taking the greater share of responsibility in deciding how to govern the growing influence
of power being exercised through cyberspace (Tapscott, 2014; Hagen, 2016; Norwegian Centre
for Information Security [NorSIS], 2016). In real world terms, this emphasizes the importance
of shared responsibility (Thomas, 1996) when managing powerful actions that occur through
cyberspace, such as those that threaten democracy itself (Vatu, 2017). Despite this, cyber security is
largely: “. . .controlled by the private sector and other nonstate actors” (Peña-López, 2016, p. 223).
Therefore negotiating and brokering this fragmentation to bring together those with complentary
needs (Thomas, 1996) becomes a governance challenge. This study takes a cross-sectorial approach
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aiming to build knowledge by identifying how different
organizations within seven key sectors, all of whom are
notable cyberpower stakeholders, in Norway (political, military,
economic, social, informational, infrastructure and diplomatic)
manage increased levels of uncertainty arising from complex and
emerging challenges presented by cyberpower effects.
The Norwegian state is governed through a national sector-
principle framework. This strategy was formally implemented in
the 70s but has been practiced since the 1800s. Each Government
Ministry is highly autonomous and specialized within its
own domain. By encouraging sector-orientated development,
ministries are empowered and responsible for their own policy
formulation and implementation. From a critical perspective
this has been described as creating segmentation within the
state (Egeberg et al., 1978) resulting from poor cross-sectorial
coordination and selective action (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2005). However, the
culture of skepticism toward centralization of power – retained
from days of Swedish and Danish rule – means the sector
principle takes precedence. To ease tensions that can emerge
between centralized and cross-sector power dynamics, inter-
sectorial relationships are encouraged beyond ministerial level
and are expected to work on the assumption that they are
based upon trust, shared values and goals; when managing
threats, challenges and vulnerabilities to systems of shared
national interest. Recently, in light of the 22 July 2011 terror
attacks in Oslo as well as threats presented through cyberspace
(Meld. St. 10, 2016–2017); such as a significant increases in
cybercrime and targeted cyber-operations by Russian hackers on
Norwegian defense and security officials (The Guardian, 2017);
the government has been required to take a more central role in
for example, national crises management (Gjørv, 2012).
Given their power and autonomy, sectors have
institutionalized certain cyberpower capacities particular to
their individual needs and goals. For example military use of
sensor capabilities in support of national and international
computer network defense; the application of advanced software
to remain competitive in global financial markets; information
operations to project a national narrative through digital
media outlets; or the utilization of digital command and control
technologies for increased efficiency in the energy and diplomatic
sectors. Whatever the capacity, it is essential to understand that,
similar to other well-intentioned institutionalized practices,
advantages are often undermined by related vulnerabilities. In
this case, dependency and reliance upon cyberspace provides
opportunities for opponents with cyberpower capacities to also:
“. . .use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events
[. . .] across the instruments of power” (Kuehl et al., 2009,
p. 38). This dynamic is redefining institutional rules of the
game in society (North, 1990; Tapscott, 2014). In developmental
terms, cyberpower has the capacity to bring about “good
change” (Chambers, 1995, p. 174) by providing opportunities
for expanded agency leading to innovative collaborations. For
example the rise of inter-enterprise computing allows for the
blurring of inter-organizational boundaries (Ostrom, 1996)
enabling new relationships to emerge that transform business
models and strategies (Tapscott, 2014). Entrepreneurship can
now reach far beyond physical borders due to globally integrated
markets and rapidly expanding networks unhindered by time
zones (Castells, 2011). Simultaneously though, cyberspace
gives agency and opportunity to antagonists and criminals to
challenge and undermine systems of governance, coordination,
cooperation and competition within and beyond cyberspace
(Nye, 2011). In 2014 the global costs of cybercrime was estimated
between US$375 billion and US$575 billion, that’s 0.6 percent of
global GDP (Center for Strategic and International Studies and
McAfee [CSIS], 2014, p. 2). The same report puts Norway’s loss
as 0.64% of national GDP (p. 9). Norwegian GDP in 2014 was
US$498 billion (World Bank, 2017, online), which equates to a
loss of US$3.2 billion.
Cyber security can be understood as attempting to protect
cyberspace and those tangible and intangible assets that function
within it: “. . .relating to the wellbeing of either individual or
society at large” (von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013, p. 101). The
Norwegian state takes a multi-stakeholder approach (Chehadé,
2014) to cyber security. According to Muller (2016) the multi-
stakeholder model is an extension of neo-liberalist thinking
as the intention is to achieve streamlined Internet governance
through decentralization of responsibility and power to promote
cooperation between the state, private sector and civil society.
Although this approach is generally seen internationally as best
practice for cyber security (Carr, 2015), even in Norway, where
public-private trust relationships are deemed to be good, there
are tensions arising from established power dynamics between
actors, as those stakeholders deemed to be the most appropriate
for good governance have so far failed to come together to
address the key challenges and vulnerabilities presented through
cyberspace (Helkala and Svendsen, 2014; Muller, 2016).
The fact that the Norwegian government allows sectors
to develop with relative autonomy makes it important to
understand cyberpowers influence on how institutional
development processes associated with cyberspace operate across
sectorial domains. The typology of this rapidly developing
phenomenon mean appreciating motivations and conflicts
related to value-based decisions – that frame selective actions
and implementation of protocols intended to prevent abuses
of cyberpower – become crucial if trust, holistic approaches
and collaborations are to form the foundations of development
actions (Hartley et al., 2002; Tapscott, 2014). This is corroborated
by earlier research that highlighted key national challenges
relating to cyber governance across government institutions; and
a lack of inter-organizational coordination and public-private
partnerships leave uncertainty concerning implementation of:
“. . .international standards, recommendations and best practices
into national strategies and guidelines” (Helkala and Svendsen,
2014, p. 10).
Multiple complex processes and interactions occur at
the interface of institutional, organizational and individual
development (Hartley et al., 2002; Leftwich and Sen, 2011).
When interfaces are less visible and shifting in a context of
value-based conflicts it is important to learn from different
perspectives and understand how competing processes create
tensions, due to inappropriate structures or inefficient practices.
Deeper appreciation for, and understanding of the institutional
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landscape can support better governance action capable of coping
with and responding to: “tensions, conflict and (re) negotiation”
(Wuyts, 1992, p. 280).
In this study, the complex issues around the governance
of cyberpower will be treated as emerging and increasingly
dominant orthodoxies that are disrupting established patterns
of living (Thomas, 2000). By deductive analysis of empirical
interview data (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008) this research explores
perspectives from key organizations within seven Norwegian
sectors; this research seeks to deepen understanding and
inform for greater appreciation of the discourse convergence
and divergence involving multiple stakeholders, disciplines and
governance levels in society, that all contribute to an institutional
landscape that is being shaped by a new form of power. The State
of Art for this paper is structured in a Complexity, Difference,
and Emergence conceptual frame. The Section “Methodology”
describes the qualitative research approach and design. The
Results are categorized and presented thematically. Further, the
Section “Discussion” frames key findings in the wider problem
context. The Section “Conclusion” makes a number of concrete
recommendations as well as plan for Section “Future Work” to
add depth and validity to this initial work.
STATE OF ART
Around the world, governments of both developed and developing
economies are taking action at national level to address
cyber security concerns [. . .] there are few obvious policy
recommendations. . .
(Peña-López, 2016, p. 223)
In Norway, the unevenness between sectors, i.e., their relative
autonomy – represents institutional contradictions that can
lead to unintended consequences (Engberg-Pedersen, 1997) as
processes of divergence and convergence occur as reactive/un-
planned policy, practice, and governance responses to emerging
challenges.
The CoDE conceptual framework (Pinder, 2016) is a highly
relevant device for opening up and deriving insights into
the ways in which cyberpower penetrates across Complex
institutional landscapes – in Norway as well as globally –
characterized by multiple interested parties, multiple fields
and multiple levels of governance. Appreciating how the
Difference in organizational identities and understandings might
affect institutional development processes as each sector comes
with its own interests, values, agendas, and culture may
help to explain why cyberpower – as an Emerging and
dynamic governance problem, characterized by uncertainty and
unpredictable outcomes – is difficult to grasp beyond military
applications.
The independent and overlapping elements of the CoDE
framework can help to explain an environment where the
effects of cyberpower are delivering impacts upon social change
processes that cannot be known in advance (Thomas, 1996).
The CoDE framework implies that institutional development
processes, taking place in over-lapping spheres (Leftwich, 1996)
occur in a multitude of ways and that, given the trans-boundary
nature of the cyberpower phenomenon, situating organizations
in their national institutional context may not necessarily define:
“what is deemed possible, acceptable and legitimate” (Hartley
et al., 2002, p. 394). Instead there are competing paradigms as
values, rules and norms (Brett, 2000) within one institution may
not be compatible with emerging institutional characteristics of
another. One outcome of this could be constrained action, as
the effects adversely impact organizational processes at the social
and cultural system levels (Hartley et al., 2002). This reinforces
the importance of building connections between institutions
through cooperation – that may require forms of interagency
collaboration (The Open University, 2000) – and vertical and
horizontal co-ordination. It also shows how institutions: “. . .by
producing stable, shared and commonly understood patterns of
behavior, are crucial to solving the problems of collective action
amongst individuals” (Brett, 2000, p. 18).
Complexity
From a development management perspective, it is understood
that institutions provide the frameworks within which
organizations operate. Similarly: “effective organizations
depend on the existence of institutions which constitute the rules
which everyone – including the managers – must accept” (Brett,
2000, p. 19). This builds on the idea that institutional change
cannot be achieved by a single agency with control over resources
and processes (Thomas, 1996). This was echoed in a recent
Norwegian Government document that specified that a direct
consequence of being one of the world’s most digitized nations
is the level of vulnerability that digital dependency brings, and
dealing with this operational problem at sector or national level
cannot be managed by one single agency (Stortingmelding,
2016–2017).
Authors such as Nye (2011) and Jasper (2012) identify the
state as the balancing agent when complex tensions arise from
the dependency vs. vulnerability paradox in conditions where:
“The more advanced a nation becomes, the more it relies on
access to the commons and the more vulnerable it becomes to the
loss of access” (Jasper, 2012, p. 60). This captures the Norwegian
context in relation to the complex implications of cyberpower
and how effects can influence institutional development across
domains. Norwegian researchers and cyber security experts
have called for greater governmental responsibility and control
in securing a cross-sectorial approach (Helkala and Svendsen,
2014; Norwegian Centre for Information Security [NorSIS],
2016). For example analysis of Norway’s cyber and information
security strategy identified three levels of potential target;
national, organizational, and individual. Each level has assets
to protect, but irrespective of criticality, each is vulnerable
to nefarious actors using cyberpower to target them. In a
context of digital dependency, the study identified a lack of
know-how and functioning legal frameworks across multiple
fields within which to manage the positive and negative
effects of cyberpower (Helkala and Svendsen, 2014). This raises
management questions when sectors have designed, developed,
and directed independent cyber security solutions, meaning
vulnerabilities and dependencies are embedded in cultural
collectives and institutions (Crewe and Axelby, 2013) that
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span multiple interested parties, multiple fields and multiple
levels.
In Long’s (2001) definition of power he states how power
is: “the outcome of complex struggles and negotiations [. . .]
and necessitates the enrolment of networks of actors and
constituencies” (p. 71). When we consider that the real world
effects of cyberpower are only emerging through an ever
expanding and entangled digital network of known and unknown
actors, then the outcomes, or the potential of power exercised
through cyberspace: “. . .clashes with our habitual patterns of the
classification of things” (Betz and Stevens, 2011, p. 128) on the
basis of authority, status, and reputation. Threats to any one
of these can present institutional and capacity constraints to
the effective functioning of inter-organizational relationships and
policies on many levels, and across sectorial fields (Kickert et al.,
1997).
Working for effective collaboration – the type that creates
collaborative advantage for broader social objectives (Huxham,
1993) – between different organizations becomes a complex
struggle as each one independently seeks to manage tensions
created by various forms of power delivered through cyberspace.
This reveals how cyberpower, in line with other dimensions of
power is relational, its struggles lie at the heart of institutional
development and it needs to be interpreted in the complex
context in which it is being conveyed (Rowlands, 1997; van
Haaster, 2016).
Difference
We can no longer take for granted what Thomas (1996) wrote
about in terms of understanding development as a: “. . .long-
term process of social change” (p. 98) or that it: “cannot be
controlled by human agency” (p. 97). What we are witnessing
today is human agency empowered by cyberpower influencing
and driving social change at rates traditional good governance
systems, and codes of practice cannot control (Stevens, 2015).
When state frameworks are unable to manage dynamics central
to multi actor steering, such as communication and control
(Rosenau, 1995); then good purposive governance is challenged.
From a global macro level we are witnessing technological
advancements outpacing and out performing human agency
(Castells, 2011). Simultaneously at state level – as Norway is
experiencing – there are concerns regarding how to manage
and govern consequences of cyberpower, such as tensions
arising from the aforementioned digital dependency vs. digital
vulnerability paradox.
When the rules of the game are changing (North, 1990)
and tensions lead to: “imperfect compromises” (Nye, 2011,
p. 16), then managing and operating in this complexity may
require greater appreciation of the digital environment and
the space it opens up for cyberpower to influence institutional
landscapes. These conditions reflect the idea that understanding
where relative power lies and identifying room for maneuver
may be more important than specific skills (Thomas, 1996).
A national study into Norwegian cyber security stated that
appreciating cyber security culture: “. . .touches upon some of
the most profound questions for development” (Norwegian
Centre for Information Security [NorSIS], 2016, p. 13). For
some, technology and its power can: “. . .take us into an age of
barbarism that will make fascism look like an exercise in charity
and human progress (Courneyeur, in Tapscott, 2014, p. 387); for
others, it creates a new environment for collaborating on shared
interests (Tapscott, 2014). These polarized perspectives resonate
with the idea of: “bringing together those with complementary
needs” (Thomas, 1996, p. 107) and presents the opportunity to
move governance approaches and thinking to: “conceptualizing a
whole development management arena as an inter-organizational
domain” (ibid, p. 107).
It is generally accepted that best practice for mitigating
negative effects and leveraging positive effects of cyberpower
is for organizations to adopt a holistic approach (Castells,
2011; Nye, 2011; Jasper, 2012; Tapscott, 2014; Hagen, 2016;
Norwegian Centre for Information Security [NorSIS], 2016).
Inevitably though, rather like evaluating good practice (Everitt,
1996), agreeing on a best practice is contested. If organizations
are to avoid collaborative pitfalls arising from known and
unknown vulnerabilities (Huxham, 1993); then a holistic
approach will require negotiation of values, goals, interests and
meaning agendas between organizations prior to any formal or
informal process of co-ordination/co-operation or collaboration
occurring.
The key to achieving the profits of digitalization is:
“collaboration and openness” (Peña-López, 2016, p. 223). Implicit
in collaboration are the functions of negotiation, information
sharing, and transparency (Robinson et al., 2000). As valuable
as these concepts are for institutional development, they
generate feelings of vulnerability at a personal and organizational
level, as they demand the giving up of power for progress.
In a development landscape with no clear architecture or
governance systems, attitudes to collaboration can harden,
pushing organizations apart as they are less willing to embrace
collaborative opportunities (Turkle, 2011; Norwegian Centre for
Information Security [NorSIS], 2016); due to the value-based
conflict between them and the transaction costs (Ouchi, 1980)
involved in collaboration. Even so, these functions are seen as
necessary for implementing holistic approaches to managing the
effects of cyberpower (Thomas, 1996; Nye, 2011; Castells, 2011;
Tapscott, 2014).
There will come a point when the requirement for inter-
organizational negotiation becomes real and organizational
collaboration needs to aspire to more than just a token concept
(Huxham, 1993). This assumption is drawn from the idea
that: “Before embarking on a strategy of coordination it is
important to check that the potential for collaboration exists”
(The Open University, 2007, p. 70) among different stakeholders.
In this context, aligning collaboration with coordination and
cooperation, will see collaboration going beyond its role of
achieving influence in public action (Thomas et al., 2001), to one
of adding a deeper level of understanding concerning how might
cyberpower be driving inter-organizational behavior.
In an uncertain or shifting landscape (Hartley et al., 2002)
understanding management approaches across critical sectors
may reveal organizational blind spots, blurred boundaries,
and how different organizational types are responding to
emerging cyberpower effects in contexts characterized by value
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based conflicts and multiple competing actors (Thomas, 1996).
Aligning governance frameworks with real world emerging
cyberpower effects driving institutional development, can build
inter-organizational relationships that support collaboration
within a digital society.
Emergence
Considering the level of digital resource dependency in Norway,
one could assume that the state backed sector-principle and
a multi-stakeholder approach to cyber security forms a solid:
“. . .basis for organizational linkages” (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978;
in Thomas, 1996, p. 107). In this context, multiple stakeholders
have a part to play in managing factors that impinge on
Norway establishing: “the necessary preconditions” (Muller,
2016, p. 2) for protecting assets from vulnerabilities presented
through cyberspace. This is critically important as it reveals
that environments – framed by cyberpower – are emerging
and presenting interesting challenges to theories and practice of
governance. Most significant is the idea, referred to above, of
development and its management as being a shared responsibility
(Thomas, 1996).
Learning from the Norwegian context may have wider
applications. For example Crewe and Axelby (2013) discuss
the idea of time following linear anthropological steps in
modernity theory. This idea is challenged as Internet access
becomes ubiquitous and the North and South experience
the effects of cyberpower together. Additionally, ideas of
dependency and paternalism can be revisited as mechanisms
of power are redistributed, creating an environment conducive
to collective self-mobilization capable of unsettling democracies,
as everything has become dependent upon a system that: “. . .
makes it easier to subvert and harder to govern” (Betz and
Stevens, 2011, P. 135). As digital citizenry expands, the need
for leadership and systems of governance with the capacity to
operate in ways that mitigate the negative effects of cyberpower
are necessary to support transformations in developed and less
mature institutions in developing countries (Goodhand, 2006;
Tapscott, 2014; Bellinger, 2016).
New tensions and conflicts created by the effects of
cyberpower add uncertainty to processes of institutional
development. For example; on the one hand, governments have
to devolve: “. . .responsibilities and authority to private actors”
(Nye, 2011, p. 16) in order to ensure state cyber security. This
makes for fragmentation and inefficiency in operationalizing
cyber security provision. On the other hand, governments are
being accused of not taking enough responsibility to ensure
citizens are correctly educated, or being told they need to do more
to: “. . .ensure an efficient and unified approach. . .” (Norwegian
Centre for Information Security [NorSIS], 2016, p. 79) to meet
the challenges presented by cyber. Investigating amongst key
stakeholders the processes, structures and capacities required
to manage such tensions, uncertainties and emerging concepts
can provide insights into achieving organizational collaborative
capabilities (Huxham, 1993). This is consistent with the literature
study that identified the need for greater collaboration, if
managers hope to effectively control development in a digital
society (Huxham, 1993; Nye, 2011; Tapscott, 2014; Hagen, 2016).
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of the methodology was to open up conceptual
boundaries and where possible build a more coherent
understanding for the term cyberpower, and its real world
effects. Where people don’t have knowledge due to lack of
data or experience, this exploration can support understanding
(Blackmore and Ison, 2007).
The levels of uncertainty surrounding the effects of
cyberpower show how it is both a real and emerging challenge.
This necessitated a principled investigation to ensure the
researcher gained an evidence based understanding of the kinds
of institutional and capacity constraints that restrict or facilitate
different organizations to get things done – or not – within this
environment of uncertainty. Establishing what is good or what
is bad practice in uncertain institutional landscapes can become
blurred when moral, empirical and ethical narratives vary. The
intention of the methodology was to support an exploration of a
shared, contested and emerging problem that is revealing itself as
a dominant force over the developed and the developing.
The author purposely chose to sample individual stakeholder
respondents from within seven sectors: Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, and Diplomatic
as the focus of the analysis. This list is not exclusive but
represents institutions that use cyberspace to: “create advantage
and influence events” (Kuehl et al., 2009, p. 38) in Norwegian
society, as well as internationally. The respondents were
coded for in text referencing when citing evidence as follows:
PR (political respondent: Senior member of Parliament); DefR
(defense respondent: senior leader for military operations);
ER (economic respondent: senior digital security engineer); SR
(social respondent: international security & defense expert);
IR (infrastructure respondent: head engineer for an energy
directorate); MR (Media respondent: expert in media leadership
and innovation); DipR (Diplomatic respondent: leader for digital
strategy).
It was expected that the researcher would hear respondents
presenting complex, different and emerging themes relating
to cyberpower effects. Based on key themes that came out
of defining and analyzing the problem, five categories were
identified: cyber governance, holistic approach, multi-stakeholder
model, new approaches, and behavior of interested parties. It was
hoped that specific opinions and perspectives concerning these
thematic areas would emerge.
To reflect the goals of the research, qualitative data gathered
through semi-structured interviews was used as the primary
method to inform about the development of operational
strategies to manage cyberpower effects. The Overarching
Questions (OQ) listed below in Table 1 represent the main lines
of enquiry. They were designed and applied to act as prompts, in
order to allow for assessment and discussion within each of the
five categories.
The limited sample size means data is partial and only presents
selective visibility of each sector (Mukherjee and Wuyts, 2014).
However, deciding to secure subjective information from senior
respondents as the primary data source helped the researcher
learn from people who know within operational environments
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TABLE 1 | Presents the overarching questions listed by category.
(1) Cyber governance
(1.1) What is understood by the term cyberpower?
(1.2) What do key stakeholders understand by the terms dependency and
vulnerability in the context of the operation of cyberpower? In what ways are the
terms seen as being in tension (or not)?
(2) Holistic approach
(2.1) In what ways are the tensions between vulnerability to and dependency
upon cyberpower manifested in operational terms?
(3) Multi-stakeholder model
(3.1) What kinds of processes and structures could support managing the
tension between vulnerability to, and dependency upon cyberpower?
(4) New approaches
(4.1) What might a bottom-up approach to managing the effects of cyberpower
entail?
(5) Behavior of interested parties
(5.1) What kinds of institutional and capacity constraints work against effective
collaboration/co-ordination between organizations, and how might those
constraints be managed and negotiated?
Overarching questions by category.
(Hanlon, 2014). A consequence of this method is possible bias
and value laden data as: “. . .those in positions of power may also
be in good positions to see and explain what is going on, even
though their self-justifications are likely to be biased” (Thomas
and Chataway, 2014, p. 333).
Given the emerging and non-boundaried nature of this
problem (Woodhouse, 2014) the researcher was aware that
organizational culture would frame language. This presented
potential contestations based on partiality of knowledge
consisting of multiple truths. When perceptions are being
framed by the wider context within which they operate (Everitt,
1996), then questions arise relating to what each respondent
considered and evaluated as good practice when managing
cyberpower in a democratic society. This richness supported
the choice of conceptual framework as it brought forward the
complexity and emergence of a developing landscape around
cyberpower. Additionally, the researcher needed to be aware that
each organization is living with pressures exerted on them from
the broader environment. These shape the organization’s actions
and influence how they choose to respond to interview question
(Roche, 2014).
Reflecting on the idea of shared responsibility (Thomas,
1996) highlights the fact that citizens have a participatory
role in shaping and defining how institutions need to
develop in response to cyberpower. However, concerns
about data quality arising from the lack of problem knowledge
amongst random samples meant the researcher decided not
to interview members of the public. Not having this data
leaves a gap in perspectives that would have contributed
to the project. Especially considering the earlier definition
of cyber security as protecting individual and societal
wellbeing. This is certainly true in light of the current view
that participatory – or what appears to be commonly referred
to now as a holistic approach – is deemed the most appropriate
for managing digital uncertainties (Tapscott, 2014; Hagen,
2016).
Respondents answered critically to interview questions as they
reflected on the complex problem. This triggered the researcher
to formatively question how their appreciation for the problem
was developing. In almost all cases the respondent reported
a change in understanding and perception. This shows how
the line of questioning prompted focused reflection on this
emergent theme, indicating that respondents were willing to
embrace complexity and seek to understand it: “. . .rather than
oversimplifying reality. . .” (Mayoux and Johnson, 2014, p. 186)
or simply taking issues for granted.
The seven informants – two female/five male – are leading
in a field they have not yet mastered, nor fully understood its
true complexity; yet they act in, on and around this continually
contested space every day (Goodhand, 2006).
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of The Norwegian Data Protection Authority.
All subjects gave written informed consent to be interviewed.
The subjects have been anonymized, no sensitive personal
information was collected and no data has been stored
electronically.
RESULTS
Data was analyzed using the five thematic areas: cyber
governance, holistic approach, multi-stakeholder model, new
approaches and, behavior of interested parties. Within these
categories a number of key sub-themes appeared. These sub-
themes are presented in Table 2 and will form the basis for
discussion in the next section. The results analysis also looked
for correlations and differences between respondents and the
literature study. Attention is drawn to themes of variations in
perspectives, complexity, uncertainty, and emergence.
Cyber Governance
Perspectives varied depending upon how different sectors
experience or use cyberpower. One respondent stated that
cyberpower is: “not cyberwar” (SR) contra DipR who considered
cyberpower to be a term that describes cyber warfare. Another
respondent bridged these two polarized perspectives by using
the contemporary ‘Hybrid War’ concept to describe cyberpowers
real world capacity to: “undermine and influence another states
political authority” (PR).
As the examples above show, the political role of cyberpower
emerged as a common theme among different respondents.
Further, respondents commented that it can be used to: “gain
power to influence for a purpose” (ER) and, it is how we:
“influence people through different levels of power” (SR). For
some this was a positive development as it: “protects values,
people, info, property, reputation, and operational ability”
(DipR). While for others: “it’s a difficult grey-zone” (DefR), and
its role has more negative connotations: “using and modifying
information technology for your own purpose” (ER). Also,
and in line with the problem definition, it can be both:
“Cyberpower is maybe the power to influence a target group, or a
population, through cyber means; for personal objectives – good
or bad” (IR).
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TABLE 2 | Lists the key sub themes that appeared during interviews.
Cyber governance Holistic approach Multi-stakeholder model New approaches Behavior of interested parties
Political role Sharing Best practice Challenge institutional norms Value conflicts





Systems of governance Framed by uncertainty Willingness to co-operate




Corresponding with the Kuehl et al. (2009) definition of
cyberpower, all respondents, including those who had either
not heard the term before, were unfamiliar with it or found
it “comprehensive” (DefR), used the term influence when
describing their understanding of cyberpower.
Further discussions revealed uncertainty how to govern
based upon institutional understanding. All respondents were
not surprised different organizations/respondents had different
understandings of cyberpower. As one respondent explained:
“organizations have different cultures and each is expected to
look at cyber risk and threats differently” (IR). This can be
related to political tensions around usage, i.e., the military
uses the same national infrastructure that citizens do. Or as
another commented: “cyber is creating an arena for political
development” (PR).
Uncertainty was an emerging shared theme concerning
small vulnerabilities that can present massive consequences.
This uncertainty is driving immediate reactive practices (ER;
DipR; IR) over long-term strategies. All respondents agreed that
dealing with the volume of network vulnerabilities complexifies
and negatively affects longer-term planning. For example in
journalism, a consequence of the operation of cyberpower is: “the
amount of uncertainty today means so much confusion looking
into tomorrow” (MR).
Governance uncertainties were again revealed as dependency
and vulnerability were reported to frame an uncertain
institutional landscape as organizations may well act in ways that
have consequences for social change, as traditional systems of
governance and codes of practice are challenged (Stevens, 2015).
As one respondent commented: “traditional means of protecting
sovereignty lack the necessary control instruments to manage
cyber effects” (DipR).
If the operation of cyberpower is creating the above context
then a respondent opinion that attempts to resolve tensions
from the dependency vs. vulnerability paradox will follow the
same developmental path as the analog world did, presents an
interesting discourse. The respondent stated: “People and their
ideas have not changed [. . .] we are not more honest, our
intentions are no better, our wishes for intake and welfare do
not change” (PR). The PR respondent followed this by saying
mechanisms for managing the operation of cyberpower will:
“become more dramatic” and “need to involve national digital
borders” (PR).
Inevitable tensions for a small nation like Norway – that
has physical territory but everything it does is dependent upon
digital interactions with the international community – arise
from the scenario presented by PR. These were emphasized
by DefRs description of future tensions if the state controls
Internet freedoms through digital borders and monitoring. This
the respondent said: “threatens a human right, the economy and
welfare security” (DefR).
Tensions are apparently being hidden as a result of
vulnerability: “tensions don’t manifest, if they did, then actions
would be taking place to address the problem” (SR). Soon
after this interview Norway’s largest digital provider Telenor
was accused of failing to take their responsibility to society
seriously. The company apparently chooses not to report all
digital-crime because they are afraid to loose control and do not
wish to co-operate with the police. In response, Telenor stated
they do not have time to review and report all incidents (Njie,
2017).
The DipR presented an interesting situation that adds
complexity and highlights that difference in intra-organizational
relationships affects institutional development processes. The
respondent explained how one group within the Norwegian
Foreign Office runs cyber business, i.e., daily operations. Whilst
another group runs the international political policy face of cyber,
rarely do the two groups meet to calibrate policy, practice or
governance.
Holistic Approach
As a member of the committee who established the national cyber
incident reporting process, IR was insightful and un-surprisingly
loyal to the system designed to be inclusive and ensure
information sharing across sectors. The IR did acknowledge
that the process is not universally applied or governed across
sectors.
A comment by ER revealed how informal collaborative
processes can take place beyond institutional frames. The
ER explained how they communicate with online groups
who analyze malicious malware, as a means of finding
solutions to new vulnerabilities. Similarly, MR noted how
journalists have to look elsewhere to find the truth, i.e., away
from: “institutions of democracy such as the White House”
(MR).
The ER formally worked in the Defense sector and highlighted
how different organizational cultures shape how they respond
to tensions. The ER described how availability is an exercise in
accepting risk in the Norwegian economic sector. Meaning they
prioritize network availability, such as BYOD or mobile banking.
However, the Defense see this exercise in risk acceptance as
unnecessary or not a priority.
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The IR commented that sharing knowledge makes knowledge
and power grow. This reflects the literature that calls for increased
power and understanding through sharing of information
beyond institutionalized boundaries (Thomas, 1996; Castells,
2011; Nye, 2011; Tapscott, 2014). Interestingly, IR followed this
statement with skepticism toward cross sector collaboration. In
IRs view, the core business of cyberpower for the military is
different to other sectors and: “It’s not necessarily true that if
you are good in one domain you can be good in another” (IR).
It was unclear if this was an organizational culture issue or
a question of best practice relating to skills and capacities not
matching.
Similarly, MR stated that journalistic organizations are
working hard to develop ethical standards and new institutional
best practices in response to cyberpower effects such as online
fake news. However, they are unwilling to coordinate outside of
their sector for fear of diminishing the integrity of the journalistic
profession.
The ER and DipR called for more government regulation
to: “address concern and confusion about what is going on
in cyberspace” (ER). SR acknowledged some top-down efforts
were in place, however, complexity arises due to conflicting
interests as: “everyone has different premises and therefore how
do you know the model is correct” (SR). Meaning theoretically:
“Things will never be fine, we are always on our way to an
improved state” (IR). Or the problem is so complex and emerging,
that finding/negotiating an ethical balance between dependency
and vulnerability is severely contested when authorities: “start
watching what you are doing on the net [. . .] then the
state becomes something else” (DefR). This is significant
when compared to comments about mechanisms for managing
cyberpower made by PR in section 4.1 Cyber Governance.
There were differences in perspectives regarding systems of
governance. PR judged a digital society needed a political system
that was up-to-date with the challenges, and Norway: “being
small and democratic should be OK” (PR). In contrast, DefR
questioned how the Norwegian democratic system is going to
cope with big emerging challenges expedited by cyberpower that
see voters seeking: “less uncertainty, less integration, and less
globalization” (DefR).
If each sector develops independently with its own values and
cultural dimension, cultivating: “truths of practice” (Everitt, 1996,
p. 179) in relation to managing vulnerabilities. Then they are able
to justify (in theory) their unique role in contributing to a just,
open, safe, and secure society. As SR commented: “The problems
are not new, they are just more interconnected. We need to
identify what is different” (SR). However, without a common
platform for collaboration the status quo - represented by power
relations framed in the sector-principle – is not challenged. This
is significant when institutional development depends upon the
level and sum of relationships between people and organizations
(The Open University, 2007).
New Approaches
All respondents agreed that leadership and generational factors
have a role in managing the effects of cyberpower. The DefR
called for new leadership philosophies that mirror technological
solutions and reach beyond a: “fenced in physical domain”
(DefR). This was explained as leadership driven by capabilities
and creating effects in wider networks. Moving from leadership
being simply about position, ownership and power, to styles
that operate with bigger pictures in mind. This concept echoes
with the idea of knowledge sharing making power grow (see
IR, section “Multi-Stakeholder Model”). These ideas present
a value-based conflict as they challenge institutional norms
for those currently occupying senior positions. As they imply
reluinquishing forms of power.
Considering the above, with regards to preparing the next
generation of leaders/managers, implies the requirement for
scaffolding innate technical skills and encouraging flexible
cognitive strategies for operating in the new digital economy
(Hoffman and Hancock, 2017; Knox et al., 2017). The PR
respondent gave an opinion that presents a challenge to
these ideas when describing a real world context: “The
younger generation is more segmented and have no need for
broad perspectives” (PR). The PR explained that this has a
negative/weakening effect on democratic development as it can
lead to political polarization and a less dynamic political debate.
These contrasting views emphasize the uncertainty surrounding
human factors in digital societies.
The PR and IR respondents commented that state aparatus
such as banks, critical infrastructure and democratic process
are being threatened in: “new ways” (PR); leading to increased
political responsibilty to manage it. This can be seen as a call for
new approaches to managing cyberpower effects that require new
literacies (Kellner, 2002) at political governance level. Another
respondent noted that a vulnerability arising from mass-media
is that people: “. . .are not skilled enough to know how to trust it”
(MR). New literacies identified in the literature study are those
that mirror the digitally interactive environemt todays students
have grown up in and have the potential to answer the question:
“where does trust come from?” (Harriss, 2000). As a respondent
noted: “Leadership today is more about the kind of person you
are not the kind of age you are” (IR).
Behavior of Interested Parties
Individual and organizational value conflicts surfaced that create
uncertainty and tension for effective collaboration. Suprisingly,
little was presented to indicate longer term solutions that go
beyond institutional frames (The Open University, 2000) to
manage these tensions. Norway is rapidly digitalizing as a
condition of a modern society (Stortingmelding, 2016–2017); and
by doing so, is knowingly increasing vulnerability to negative
development (Jasper, 2012). A respondent made this point clear:
“we are pushed to use the cyber domain” [and establish a] “shared
security culture within a domain that is inherently vulnerable”
(DipR).
It would appear that approaches to the sector-principle may
be leading to negative developments in the face of cyberpower
challenges. This may be due to multiple conflicting formal and
informal policy and practice agendas shaping progress. The
sector-principle was described as: “good, but a big challenge”
(DefR). Further, three constraining factors were presented; “It’s
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very hard to coodrinate cross sector as each sector has its
own Department; threats in one sector may not get heard by
another; the principle makes it hard for effective use of time
and resources” (DefR). These conditions are compounded by
powerful unwritten rules that incentivize or sanction depending
on different interpretations (Brett, 2000). One such example is:
“When it comes cyber, its effects and managing collaborations,
industry is the one leading the way and setting the agenda” (IR).
The willingness to co-operate across sectors is restricted
for the exact reason that: “. . .it implies reciprocal sharing of
rights and responsibilities” (Robinson et al., 2000, p. 226).
When cyberpower is added to this context, with its power to
out pace traditional good governance and codes of practice
(Stevens, 2015), then a conflicted institutional development
landscape is manifest. If interested parties want to develop,
then it: “may require a new way of collaborating” (DipR)
as conventional models of sharing/information exchange may
no longer apply. However, when generalizing about current
behaviors, a respondent commented: “You can build a network
but it doesn’t exist if it is not used” (PR).
In a time when lack of trust – due to multiple vulnerabilities –
is a major factor shaping action, all respondents believed there
is a will to collaborate and co-ordinate to improve management
of vulnerabilities arriving through cyberspace. However, when
each sector investigated; political, defense, economic, diplomatic,
infrastructure, media and social has its own policies, domain
of responsibility and private sector service providers; then the
idea of co-operating with another sector – that has a completely
different set of operating conditions and core business relating to
how it applies or manages cyberpower – was seen as something
that would create tension (IR; MR).
The MR gave an example of collaboration for survival. In the
financial sector banks are collaborating to build power in the area
of digital payment via mobile apps. This way smaller banks gain
strength, and improve their survivability against future ‘online’ –
international – competitors (Reuters, 2017). In the media sector:
‘no option’ collaboration was described as ‘convergence’, and
exemplified by the amount of mixed content online (MR). The
MR commented that agreeing the ethics of media and journalism
when cyberpower is re-shaping the core of the industry is a major
persistent challenge. This is a consequence when the rules of the
game are changing (North, 1990) and tensions lead to: “imperfect
compromises” (Nye, 2011, p. 16).
DISCUSSION
The following evidence-based discussion relates empirical
findings to the characteristics of the problem. The intent is
to nudge thinking to avoid taken-for-granted practices that
may be blocking institutional development (Everitt, 1996) and
where possible; open the debate among stakeholders concerning
the complexity, difference and emerging ways cyberpower is
impacting institutional development.
The different cross sector perspectives revealed by respondents
contribute to explaining why cyberpower is not yet a fully
understood term. As the results reveal, cyberpower was shown to
influence organizations differently depending upon their domain
of interest. Significantly, the results not only align with the
literature, they extend our understanding regarding the ubiquity
of cyberpower. Critically the way cyberpower affects institutional
development, across all levels of society, make its role inherently
political (Standt, 1991) and therefore a governance challenge. The
complex characteristics of cyberpower – most prominently seen
as emerging positive uses and negative abuses – ranging from
those that enrich human life through access to information, to
those that undermine another land’s political authority; imply
the need for a wider political space if there is to be a common
platform for collaboration (Wood, 2003). Taking a shared
responsibility (Thomas, 1996) approach to cyber security – in
the form of jointly developed national strategies and guidelines
(Helkala and Svendsen, 2014) – could present opportunities
for improving certainty around governance policy and practice.
This may in turn encourage better intra and inter-organizational
relationships for institutional development.
The finding that one respondent found cyberpower a difficult
term (IR), another didn’t use it (PR), and one viewed it as
comprehensive (DefR), is a valuable outcome. Not only does it
emphasize the richness of the problem, the fact that respondents
were able to locate themselves and their organization within the
problem space, means it has some level of relevance for them.
Going forward, defining cyberpower in a way that demands less
explicit knowledge of the term ‘cyberspace’ and less effort to
unpack the slightly abstract terms: ‘operational environments’
and ‘instruments of power’ (Kuehl et al., 2009, p. 38) could
make the concept more approachable. In practical terms this
would help penetrate the consciousness of a wider demographic
by situating the word cyberpower into their everyday lexicon.
This would support moving understanding forward from the
current state where cyberpower has relevance, but conflicting
interests and value conflicts mean it is not yet a well categorized
or operationalized concept.
The interview responses from ER, DipR and IR build on the
understanding that organizations are relying on individualized
assets to seek immediate security priorities ahead of pursuing
long-term goals (Wood, 2003). If this deliberate survival strategy
response to dealing with uncertainty reflects organizational
best practice in digitally advanced Norway; then the likelihood
is that governance uncertainties in developing states – with
weaker institutions and governance mechanisms – could
be more of destructive and destabilize their digital moral
universe (Wood, 2003; UNWOMEN, 2015). The operation of
cyberpower is increasing vulnerability and creating consequences
for dependency that present a new ‘Faustian bargain’: staying
dependent, staying vulnerable. This occurs as the negative
effects appear to frame: “dysfunctional time preference behavior”
(Wood, 2003, p. 455). As reported by ER, DipR, IR, and
MR, institutional governance uncertainty when dealing with
immediate vulnerabilities and insecurities arriving through
cyberspace, displaces individuals and organizations ability to
focus on long-term strategies (Wood, 2003).
The near horizon debate in Norway concerning digital
borders will be framed by governance uncertainty and could
have destabilizing effects as it concerns not just: “human
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rights, the economy and welfare security” (DefR). It will also
influence organizational cultures, environmental factors and
power dynamics between government, the private sector and
citizens. Institution leaders need to learn from these tensions
and share knowledge gained, good and bad. This is necessary
to support longer-term strategies designed cope with cyberpower
effects. A number of respondents described the non-collaborative
practices of interested parties and unwillingness to share. When
attempting to manage the effects of cyberpower, such issues
should be addressed, and institutional building should be seen
as: “. . .an incremental, sequential process which depends on
learning and stimulates self-transformation” (Harriss, 2000,
p. 234). Meaning that collaboration, in the form of information
sharing, can form the foundation of co-operation based upon
communication, reframing of problems and shared learning. If
building co-operation is a step to institution building (Harriss,
2000), then the results of this research reveal the pressing need
for new approaches that build collaboration capacities capable of
facilitating better co-operation over time.
Institutionalized systems of governance and practices framed
in policies: “crafted to meet the needs of the past” (Tapscott,
2014, p. 390) are struggling to: “get ahead of the game for long
enough to really commit resources for the future” (Wood, 2003,
p. 458). This may be the case in Norway as national governance
structures limit the prospect of open collaboration in the face
of emerging vulnerabilities arising from digital dependency. The
comments by DefR that the sector-principle is a big challenge
and makes it hard for effective use of time and resources counter
the assumption that the sector-principle and a multi-stakeholder
approach to cyber security form any kind of best practice (Carr,
2015), or solid enough basis for organizational linkages (Salancik
and Pfeffer, 1978; in Thomas, 1996). Any delay or failure to
adapt to a problem that is redefining institutional rules of the
game in society (North, 1990; Tapscott, 2014) will only increase
transaction costs in the long term (Ouchi, 1980).
As the results indicate, the effects of cyberpower are creating
an institutional landscape framed by leadership uncertainty
and a complex struggle about what is: “getting the work
done by the best means available” (Thomas, 1996, p. 100).
A consequence of this may be more government control (Helkala
and Svendsen, 2014; Tapscott, 2014; Norwegian Centre for
Information Security [NorSIS], 2016) resulting in top-down
command and control mechanisms (Fayol, 1916/1949). For the
respondents in this research, this development may represent
a ‘more dramatic’ governance mechanism (PR), the idea of the
state becoming something different than it is today (DefR), or an
approach that may falter due to conflicting interests concerning
models of governance (SR). In Norway, this praxis would run
against cultural norms and meet significant resistance. Therefore,
maintaining the status quo and pursuing the management policy
of empowering and enabling (Paton, 1991) sectors – that is
“molded to the interests of [. . .] the state” (Thomas, 1996,
p. 104) – will require greater space for expressive innovative
collaborations if Norway is going to manage the tensions between
vulnerability to, and dependency upon cyberpower.
The problem definition identified that managing cyberpower
may require new and more adaptive approaches beyond current
institutional frames (Conklin, 2006; McDonnell, 2016). The
results build on this as respondents identified new human
factor capability based leadership models that create effects in
the wider network (DefR), and are less about age and more
about personality and knowledge (IR). Further, when Castells
(2011) and Tapscott (2014, p. 89) refer to building relationship
capital through a collaborative infrastructure, then the above
approaches may well support prosperity through the practice
of trust, and joint decision-making by providing the: “cultural
glue [for the] . . .new [digital] developmental paradigm” (Castells,
2011, p. 213).
New literacies that integrate conceptual and skill areas
(Thomas, 1996, p. 100) are those that include critical thinking,
complex problem-solving, expert communication and applied
knowledge in real world settings (Peña-López, 2016). At a
personal and organizational level this implies the need to develop
a range of capacities capable of building the relationship capital
necessary for managing engagement with the digital world.
The interview data highlighted that modes of governance
for managing cyberspace – and the vulnerabilities it presents
to public and private entities – could lie beyond the current
sector-principle institutional frame. Power dynamics between
sectors (Muller, 2016) need to become more than barriers
to comprehensive cyber security. Power needs to become the
catalyst for development of new knowledge through improved
collaborative behavior. All respondents stated the need for better
organizational strategies, a greater capacity to find long-term
solutions to novel vulnerabilities, and identified the understand
function as a weakness across sectors. Choosing not to manage
the dependency vs. vulnerability paradox could be a source of
failure as the negative effects of cyberpower lead to institutional
decay.
CONCLUSION
We are witnessing powerful effects arriving through cyberspace
that present real world shared problems that could not have
been foreseen. A consequence of this is the political reality that
existing national structures of governance may be struggling to
cope. When a functioning society and all its assets – tangible and
intangible – depend upon cyberspace then a holistic approach
explicitly frames all parts of the whole (OED, 2017). This means
that cyberpower and its unpredictable impacts on social change
processes (Thomas, 1996) demands greater attention.
Uncertainties emerging from cyberspace will persist as
technology develops, governments support digital rollout for
economic development, and increased network capabilities lead
to planned positive outcomes and, emerging negative outcomes
for people and organizations dependent upon cyberspace.
Vulnerabilities are leading to time dysfunctional behavior and
possible destructive decision-making in the form of for example
imposing digital borders. The implication for institutional
development is how to create the necessary national trust
conditions across and within sectors that encourage openness,
transparency and information sharing for positive institutional
development in times of uncertainty.
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The idea that understanding is no longer a condition
of knowing but an activity involving dialog (Everitt, 1996)
frames the current situation regarding man-made cyberspace.
Dealing with emerging challenges and: “fundamental changes
to society” (Tapscott, 2014, p. 386) may require dialogical
activities that realign institutional frames to ensure what
we created – but no longer understand (Nye, 2011) – does
not undermine institutional development processes. As the
data from this study reveals, if sectors and organizations are
not mandated to follow national cyber incident reporting
structures, or are not: “directly subject to a national cyber
security policy” (ER); then this demonstrates why leaders
need the capacities to work with uncertainty, to negotiate
complex institutional landscapes and relationships, understand
threats and identify opportunities to bring stakeholders
together.
The extent to which the respondents showed an awareness
of the need for these capacities within their organization was
inconclusive. What is apparent is that advancing institutional
agendas in dynamic environments, where outcomes cannot be
predicted is more about maintaing current operational output,
than investing in human capacities capable of providing longer-
term development solutions.
As one respondent noted:
• The shared perspective concerning cyberpower is that people
are reluctant to look too closely at the problem cos they don’t
know the right questions to ask if they do, and they lack the
imagination about what might come or be about to happen.
They are reluctant to accept their own vulnerability (DipR).
Co-operative processes can reveal organizational common
ground and interdependencies as opposed to stressing the
differences (Robinson et al., 2000). Where collaboration potential
exists beyond organizational boundaries (The Open University,
2007), then a new model of collaboration that activates
engagement between stakeholders can become a key feature
to support shared understanding, founded on common values
and goals. Driven by the need to build capacities capable of
managing joint vulnerabilities that arrive through cyberspace and
contribute to decay or weakening of institutions (Robinson et al.,
2000).
The governance challenge, when policies and practices are
institutionalized, is apparent in Norway. Transforming the
sector-principles’ capability to function in a digital development
paradigm means moving from a regime of truth that maintains
power relations in Norwegian society (Everitt, 1996) to a model
capable of responding to the new approaches, opportunities
and challenges posed by cyberpower. This study has shown
that this will require management of conflicting values, novel
developments and emerging contexts, founded on capacitates
capable of mobilizing resources and shaping alliances (Thomas,
1996).
Recommending practices that can become the strategic
corner stone for managing the ways institutional development
is affected by the growing influence of cyberpower – such
as the dependency vs. vulnerability conflict – will involve
new models of leadership that educate and empower-to-
enable younger generations to operate beyond structural frames.
This will allow for collaborative advantage in ways that
are context orientated rather than restricted by hierarchical
norms of communication structures (Knox et al., 2018). This
means individuals being free to deliver effects in the broader
environment beyond organizational boundaries in collaboration
with trusted partners.
To conclude, the following recommendations are made:
(a) Further research aimed at defining cyberpower in a
way that is more universally appealing and usable. For
example:
Cyberpower is the capability to influence tangible and
intangible assets through digital means.
(b) Organizations should commit time and human resources
to improve institutional development prospects when
faced with effects of cyberpower. Not doing so means
continuing to contribute to their own vulnerability leaving
them more precarious as they: “stretch[. . .] out a survival
strategy” (Wood, 2003, p. 229).
(c) Conceptualize cyberpower as a whole inter-organizational
domain of shared responsibility to improve prospects of
achieving a holistic approach.
(d) Encourage the merging of inter-organizational boundaries
enabling new relationships – grounded in shared
responsibilities – to emerge, that can transform
management models and strategies.
(e) Encourage expressive innovative collaborations oriented
toward co-creation and: “building up the capacity to
maintain influence into the future” (Thomas, 1996,
p. 103).
(f) See managing cyberpower as a shared development:
“activity and attitude” (Wrangham, 2016) founded upon
skills such as unstructured problem solving, critical
thinking, learning and reasoning. To build these capacities
takes modes of education that focus on: “non-routine,
higher order cognitive skills”, relating to: “new [digital]
economy skills” (Peña-López, 2016, pp. 123, 267).
FUTURE WORK
Cyberpower is creating a context where a lack understanding
about tomorrows threats, leads to fragmentation, inefficiency and
actions that: “favor meeting immediate needs over future ones”
(Wood, 2003, p. 231). Firstly, bringing stakeholders together –
who would not normally interact over this problem – would
support a more principled investigation in terms of relationships
between actors. Action research of this type would be a
valuable next step, as the outcomes may support more evidence-
based recommendations for managing collaborations intended to
advance institutional agendas in a dynamic environment where
outcomes cannot be predicted. Secondly, to add depth and richer
comparative evaluations, further data collection from within
individual sectors could reveal internal data patterns, as well
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as allow for increased comparison across sectors at respective
hierarchies.
This research contributes empirical data to an emerging and
globally shared phenomenon that is: “. . .posing more questions
than answers” (Tapscott, 2014). Through seeking to ground the
term cyberpower in the lexicon of change agents through a
process of interweaving different perspectives and understanding,
this study and related future work could broaden the range
of conceptual tools available to development mangers when
addressing the issues of dependency vs. vulnerability.
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